Rethinking The Deterrence Theory Criminology Essay

Rethinking The Deterrence Theory Criminology Essay With much popular appeal, the concept of deterrence has been widely accepted and understood, by judges and parliamentarians alike, to be a central tenet in the principles of sentencing and the wider penal system in England and Wales. Significantly, section 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 expressly enjoins sentencers to take account of deterrence as one of the purposes of sentencing when determining what and how severe the appropriate punishment in a given case should be. In practice, as deterrence is widely perceived by judges, not only in the English and Welsh jurisdiction, but also elsewhere in the common law world, as a primary means through which to afford public protection, in many cases involving adult offenders, precedence has tended to be given to deterrence over other considerations in the interest of the community.  [3]  Nevertheless, tensions are palpable between deterrence and other sentencing aims.  [4]  The question of, for instance, whether punishment s hould be an end in and of itself, or whether it ought to be understood as a facilitator of the ideal of offender rehabilitation, remains in the front line of critical discourses into sentencing in the contemporary era.  [5]  Thus, it has become increasingly necessary to deliberate upon the worthiness and value of deterrence not only in the context of sentencing but also to the purpose of the entire penal system. Within this context, the following essay will proceed by first providing an overview of the paradigm of deterrence within the broader framework of the contemporary penal system. It will then attempt to identify and question the moral and empirical underpinnings thereof. Further, it argues that from a criminological or sociological perspective, efforts to achieve deterrent effect, in particular where the individual offender is concerned, are in large part counterproductive. Finally, this essay observes, whilst arguing that deterrence as a penological theory is morally and empirically unsound, that it would be impractical to assume that deterrence will be abandoned altogether in English sentencing law in the near future. Rather, the more prudent and reasonable way to approach the matter would be to continue to observe the constantly evolving concept in an era of significant social, cultural, political and economic change. In conjunction with other penal theories, elements of deterrence will appear to remain a highly influential sentencing tool. Exposition of the deterrence theory Deterrence is one of the oldest paradigmss in the history of criminological and jurisprudential inquiry. As early as in the early eighteen century, the primary purpose of state imposed punishments was said to be the reduction of crime, by means of terrifying [potential offenders] into obeying the law.  [6]  The punishment of prison and the deterrence it brings about, by the relinquishment of the fundamental freedoms, were onceived of as the best means of reducing offending in modern society  [7]  . Johnson defines the verb deter as to discourage by terror, to fright from anything.  [8]  Deterrence can also be defined as including two separate aspects, depending on the class of people being directed at, namely individual (specific) deterrence and general deterrence.  [9]  Translated into judicial language in the specific context of sentencing, a Hong Kong judge, HHJ Ching Y Wong SC, drew the distinction thus: A deterrent sentence may be in personam [that is, individual] or in rem [that is, general]. Normally if the circumstances that pertain to an offender are such that the court is of the opinion that it must be brought home to him that he is not to commit such offences again, for example, a repeat offender, a deterrent sentence  in personam  is proper. When an offence is, inter alia, so prevalent or is so serious within its class, and the court is of the opinion that those of like minds are to be strongly discouraged from committing the same or similar offences, then a deterrent sentence  in rem  is called for.  [10]   In simpler terms, specific deterrence is directed at the offender in question and is expected to prevent her from reoffending by the imposition of punishment; general deterrence, on the other hand, focuses on the public at large, and prevents potential offenders from engaging in criminal conduct in the first place.  [11]   With its roots in the classical and utilitarian thinking of crime,  [12]  the deterrence theory is often compared to a cost-benefit analysis performed in the economic field.  [13]  Underlying the theory is the assumption that all offenders, and potential offenders, are by nature rational, the hallmark of their actions being the pursuit of maximum pleasure and minimum pain. It follows that, as offenders choose, rationally and voluntarily, to commit crime, they respond readily to the perceived costs and benefits of their actions.  [14]  As Lundman explains, If their calculations suggest that perceived benefits will exceed possible costs, then rational [offenders] commit [crimes] in anticipation of enjoying rewards. However, if these calculations lead [criminals] to conclude that costs will exceed rewards, then the rational course of action is to seek gratification in ways other than [criminality].  [15]   In other words, if the calculation of the consequences of offending leads to the conclusion that there is more to be lost than there is to be gained from committing crime, the potential offenders should be naturally deterred.  [16]  Thus, within the utilitarian framework criminals are invariably errant, though still rational, individuals whose perversity or anti-social self interests serve to offer some perceived benefits of offending.  [17]  It is in this light that Bentham passionately argues for the usefulness of deterrence, on the ground that the threat of punishment is the force employed to restrain [possible offenders] from commission of crime, from which the pain of punishment might result.  [18]   Underlain by these ideas of rationality and self-interest, for deterrence theorists there are certain qualities necessary to an effective deterrent punishment. As Newburn elaborates on these qualities first enunciated by Beccaria  [19]  , punishment must come with certainty and be enforced consistently, and that it does should be acknowledged by the offender; there must be celerity in the law, with punishment coming as promptly as possible, in order that both the public and the offender himself could see the relationship between the punishment and the offence as inevitably causal; and finally, it must be properly proportionate to the crime, namely one that is relatively mild and moderate and inflicts pain just exceeding the advantage derivable from the crime.  [20]   Moral problems with the deterrence theory An emphasis on deterrence often leads to a harsher sentence than the offender would otherwise be deemed to deserve.  [21]  The Court of Appeal has held, relying on the Strasbourg jurisprudence, that the legitimate object of deterrence can, in appropriate cases, amply justify such sentences.  [22]  It seems apparent that in such cases the sentencing aim of deterrence can be paramount. Whilst weight would, in theory, have been accorded to the interests of the offender, where the alleged crimes are considered as threatening the wider community, the utilitarian theory of deterrence demands that individual rights and proportionality, in its narrow sense, subsume under the societal interests.  [23]   Young is critical of this judicial use of deterrence as a sentence enhancing factor.  [24]  He argues, not unconvincingly, that the theory is arguably inconsistent with fundamental notions of justice.  [25]  Indeed, why a persons liberty need be sacrificed for the educational impact it will have on others is a legitimate question to pose. This concern has been shared by del Vecchio, who emphatically stated that the human person always bears in himself something sacred, and it is therefore not permissible to treat him merely as a means towards an end outside of himself.  [26]   A more fundamental moral weakness of the notion of deterrence pertains to the coherency of its ideological premise rationality. As in the analysis in Part I, deterrence has traditionally built upon the premise that individuals will desist from reoffending because of the fear inherent in the discipline and punishment meted out by the state. In a moral sense, then, a semblance of common reasoning is central to the application of the utilitarian understanding of deterrence. Yet, as the famous philosopher John Rawls persuasively argues, there is no reason to assume that our sense of justice can be adequately characterised by familiar common sense precepts or derived from the more obvious learning principles.  [27]   It seems indeed somewhat simplistic to assume offenders as rational beings before or in the course of committing a crime. As the Home Office rightly conceded in 1990, offenders very seldom weigh up the possibilities prior to their conduct and typically do not act only after on rational premeditation.  [28]  In many instances criminals need to take their decisions hastily. Two young males fighting in a public street, for example, are unlikely to have ever thought about the consequences of their actions in the heat of the moment.  [29]  Moreover, as Cornish and Clarke argue, the decision-making process of offenders is remarkably limited in their understanding of possibilities, potentials and consequences.  [30]  For instance, most petty criminals are often badly informed about the criminal liability, let alone the penalties, associated with the crimes they commit.  [31]  As a result, even accepting that offenders are rational, it would be difficult, if not impossible, f or offenders to have accurately balanced the costs and benefits of the commission of the criminal act.  [32]   The weakness becomes even more obvious in the case of such rarer but usually more horrendous crimes as those involving violence, the offenders of which are characteristically not reasoning. Hudson plausibly argues that crimes of such kind are usually committed without a prior careful calculation of risk.  [33]  Most killings, for instance, are not rationally planned, but are impulsive and driven by strong emotion.  [34]  In other instances, such are crimes that involve intentionality where offenders commit crime regardless of the risk.  [35]   Interestingly, probably comprehending the moral difficulties existing therein, English courts have rarely invoked deterrence as a standalone ground for an otherwise disproportionate sentence. It is often relied on in conjunction with other penal theories. Deterrence has, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, customarily been recognised as the twin of punishment.  [36]  Thus some commentators have gone further in contending that, in fact, punitiveness resides in the epicentre of the contemporary penal policies supposedly informed by the utilitarian principles of deterrence.  [37]  For them, the current political discourse and policy initiatives [blame] the offenders, [silence] excuses à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ and [see] the punishment of the wrongdoer as the proper response.  [38]  Deterrence, then, has not been upheld on any principled basis, but has rather been reduced to a morality that has to be upheld whatever the functional benefits.  [39]   As a result, from a philosophical perspective, classical utilitarianism upon which the theory of deterrence is based would seem quite unable to do justice to the mode in which many of our actual ends matter to us.  [40]   The epirical (in)validity of the deterrence theory It seems fair, to say that the empirical literature examining deterrence has not yielded enormous success different studies often tend to contradict each other, on occasions directly and completely.  [41]  Some evidence suggests that swift punishments do not abate the incidence of subsequent crimes any more than delayed punishments, owing to the cognitive capacity of humans to imagine.  [42]  More research efforts have been put into the consideration of the other two aspects of deterrence. By and large, there is some evidence, albeit anecdotal in one way or another, showing that certainty of punishment has a greater deterrent effect than does severity of punishment.  [43]   However, even this is more than what Radzinowicz and King have been prepared to accept. They quite sensibly argue that, more precisely, it is the certainty of detection or intervention, not of punishment, that is the more crucial element in deterrence.  [44]  Lending support to this view, commenting on figures in the United States, Cornish and Clarke suggests that offenders are more likely to be put off by the immediate fear of exposure and being caught, as opposed to the threat of some penalty relatively remote in time.  [45]  Thus it may not be any surprise when Gough concludes that deterrence should only be a minor consideration, if occupying a role to play at all, for the purposes of sentencing.  [46]  What is needed, in Goughs opinion, is tougher enforcement and targeted strategies that increase detection certainty, rather than any toughening of sanctions. On the other hand, there is a more critical view that the reduction of crime in these studies cannot be ascribed to deterrence. What have been influential might well have been the incapacitating effect of the punishment or other myriad variables quite apart from the risks of punishment, including the motive for the crime, the strength of the temptation, the strength of inhibitions or moral revulsion against it.  [47]   In any case, all these studies, deriving as they do from crime statistics, must be interpreted with caution, whether they be supportive or dismissive of the deterrence principles. After all, there are no such things as empirical truths as such.  [48]  In determining whether or not deterrence should be regarded as being beset by empirical difficulties, the entire discussion would prove moot if one does not appreciate the problem of interpreting crime statistics in the first place. Notoriously, any organised way of understanding about crime, criminals and crime control framed in definitional and empirical terms is intricately problematic.  [49]  Ultimately, criminality is a natural by-product of such industrial, capitalist experience as economic growth, the easier availability of social opportunities, and the increased recognition of individual liberties.  [50]  It is essentially a social construct, varying as it does across time, place and people.  [51]  Viewed from such a perspective, deterrence is but part of a means devised by the state to statistically manage the social problem of crime.  [52]  Put in this wider social and political perspective, the extent to which deterrence is, just as punishment, thought to be a fundamentally important social theory inescapably reflects the broader political economy of the urban society in which one lives.  [53]   As such, although crime data and criminal statistics are ostensibly transparent and open manifestations of offending patterns, to divorce the quantifiable empirical data from the broader politicisation of crime would be an unrealistic exercise provided the complex settings in the modern liberal democracy such as this country, in which crime, sociology and political economy are inextricably intertwined.  [54]  Doubts have therefore historically been cast onto the verity of the official figures with the most pessimistic criminological interpretations suggesting that crime statistics are universally doctored, and thus of limited worth to the understanding of the relationship between crime, the state and punishment.  [55]  In the final analysis, imagining crime figures as being free from bias would be to ignore the tension between broad generalization and the specification of empirical particulars,  [56]  and the interpretation thereof will inevitably entails an overly object ive view of an inherently subjective phenomenon.  [57]   The anti-deterrent effects of punishment: a criminological perspective Some criminologists do not merely dismiss deterrence as unconvincing, but have gone further in arguing that, quite far from producing the intended result, fear of punishment might sometimes lead directly to the commission of crime. It is possible that a criminal who has already offended, but not yet apprehended, feels that they have little to lose from further offending, because they have to be punished anyway. As Taylor cites as a striking example, at some point in the last century, a substantial minority of unmarried women in Scotland have been driven to commit infanticide exactly because of the fear of being publicly humiliated as a punishment for adultery.  [58]   For those who have been apprehended and punished, further offending behaviour is still not impossible under the labelling theory, under which criminality is to be thought of as a quality created inevitably when punitive sanctions are applied to behaviour considered to be offending.  [59]  The offender takes on a criminal identity when he is labelled as such by a range of social reactions, including and following the imposition of an official sanction, which has the effect of isolating her from society.  [60]  Her opportunity to live by legitimate means whilst being labelled criminal would quite conceivably be reduced considerably, and resort might then have to be had to illegitimate ways of life. In this way the label is dramatised to the extent that it becomes entrenched and internalised.  [61]  In this light, the labelled, stigmatised and socially isolated, have to accept their status as criminals and rebuild their lives accordingly, leading to a greater degree of devia nce.  [62]   In this sense, punishment within the context of deterrence may in truth be counterproductive in reducing incidence of recidivism.  [63]  With all the negative social interactions that punishment entails, a sentence which speaks to the deterrence of the individual offender appears to reinforce the self-prophecy of criminality, render reintegration into the conventional world difficult, and a criminal career almost inevitable.  [64]  Thus punishment with a deterrent element may ironically result in the promotion of the kind of activities that it is designed to prevent. Conclusion: Abandoning deterrenceà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦or not? Deterrence has for the most part been discounted as an effective and justifiable approach to sentencing by academics, in particular criminologists, who are often more willing to consider the causes in addition to the consequences of criminal activity.  [65]  However, the popular appeal of the notion as a commonsense approach to sentencing appears to persist to this day. Given the important case of Attuh-Benson,  [66]  it seems unlikely that attempts, however able and sincere, to bring the criticisms levelled against the usefulness of deterrence before the courts would be of any avail. There the Court of Appeal forcefully pronounced that [i]f a different approach is to be adopted it should be in response to guidance from the Sentencing Guidelines Council who may wish to consider this matter.  [67]  After all, it is important to bear in mind that the way in which the state responds to criminality has always constituted an inexorably divisive conundrum with hardly any consensus as to what ought to represent a just punishment.  [68]  And sentencers, even those of the eminence and seniority of the Lord Justices of Appeal, will understandably consider and defer to the legislative objectives set forth in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, one of those being deterrence. Indeed, according to established principles of the common law, this is not an ar ea in which the court should, in the words of Borins DCJ, sitting in the Canadian Supreme Court, pass on the wisdom of Parliament.  [69]  As such, discourses of deterrence are likely to remain a distinguishing feature of the English sentencing policy, as in elsewhere in the world. (4172 words) Table of cases: Canada: Ciccone  (1974) 7  SASR 11  October, 113 Guiller (1985) 48 CR (3d) 226 Luxton  (1990) 58 CCC (3d) 449 Smith (1987) 34 CCC (3d) 97 England and Wales: Attuh-Benson [2004] EWCA Crim 3032 Bieber [2008] EWCA Crim 1601 Brown v Stott  [2001] 2 WLR 817 Holloway  (1982) 4 Cr. App. R. (S) 128 Howells  [1999]  1 All ER  50 Sargeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74   Zampa  (1984) 6 Cr. App. R. (S) 110 European Court of Human Rights: Ezeh Connors v. United Kingdom  (2004) 39 EHRR 1 Hong Kong: AG v Tang King-ming  [1986] HKLR 211 HKSAR v Hiroyuki Takeda [1998] 1 HKLRD 931 Secretary for Justice v Ma Ping-wah [2000] 2 HKLRD 312

Identity: Wild Cat Falling by Colin Johnson, Pleasantville (1998)

Who am I? The question sounds cliche, but let’s be serious. Don’t you believe there is something inside you that you can’t describe, but seems to say, â€Å"This isn’t who I am, or who I planned to be†. The texts I have read emphasise the belief that socialization creates a mask, a false identity concealing the self and who we are to be. However, it is widely believed that identity is a product of socialization- that the self changes through our individual experiences. The persona of WCF is a victim of these processes. CJ’s use of shifting temporal frames allows us to review the persona’s past whilst retaining the present, demonstrating the impact of his childhood experiences on his identity. Jesse Duggan was an influential figure in protagonist’s formative years; her fear of the western culture lead her to condition her son into white society: â€Å"they belong to the white side of the fence. You’ve got to prove you do and don’t you forget it†. She isolates him from his traditional culture and instils in him the stigmas of the lesser breed. The persona’s frequent self derogatory remarks about being â€Å"a mongrel† and â€Å"born under the curse of Ham† indicate how society’s treatment of ‘Noongars’ has affected him. Socialization has isolated the protagonist, denying him his cultural identity and stifling his hopes. Throughout, the persona also remains anonymous, insinuating that his identity is amorphous. Yet we clearly see his mask; â€Å"I took a long look at him and sneered back in my best Hollywood crim voice†. His tone is satirical, as if he knows, his ‘crim’ act is not a true reflection of his identity. And in spite of this mask, his ‘core’ identity can also be seen: â€Å"I stood on the bed, face pressed to the bars, gulping the salt-sea tang until I became part of its crashing surf and soundless depths. † His mask hides his true nature, nonetheless it is revealed through his poetic sensibility. Eliot’s 1911 poem ‘Prufrock’ is a dramatic monologue of a middle-class English-man. For him, socialization demands his conformity to social norms, making him feel imprisoned by its mediocrity: â€Å"for I have known them all already, known them all; have known the evenings, mornings, afternoons†. The repetition of ‘known them all’ portrays life as routine without purpose. â€Å"my morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin; my necktie rich and modest† the detail of his dress elaborately conceals his identity and his true feelings about society. Ironically, the repetition of ‘my’ implies an illumination of identity, rather than its suppression. It seems the Prufrock is afraid reveal his identity may ‘disturb the universe’: â€Å"do I dare, and, do I dare? Avoiding this ultimate question, he seeks peace in oblivion: I should have been a pair of ragged claws; scuttling across the floors of silent seas†. We are gregarious creatures, and Prufrock’s desire for isolation is untenable to us. Socialization has trapped him in a rock and a hard place: he may choose the peaceful oblivion of a void anyday, but he is too scared to reject a mask that he despises in case it may change his world: oh the irony! The 1998 film Pleasantville explores the effects of stepping out of a uniform society. they just happen to see something inside themselves that’s different†. This shot is taken from below, establishing this as a powerful argument and putting David in a position of power over the crowd. He is persuading Pleasantville that embracing your core values defines you as unique; special. He also ‘colours’ George Parker, by revealing to him his intrinsic values: â€Å"don’t you think she looks just as beautiful as the first day you met her? Now don’t you wish you could tell her that? The proxemics in this shot exaggerates David’s emotions and influences his father’s reaction. A shot of David is taken from the court’s POV, which allows for tension to rise before he moves to the side to reveal his ‘coloured’ father. The diagetic tone of shocked voices, coupled with the non-diagetic, soft music that swells at this new revelation, is us ed to highlight the importance of this scene as unearthing your inner self. It seems to say: this is the moment of epiphany, the moment when you discover this universe holds something wonderful and rare, just for you. In David’s own words â€Å"if you just have the guts† to look inside yourself, you’ll find all that â€Å"who am I to be† crap alot easier to handle. WCF’s persona began to confront that ‘song’ or ‘dream’ that had always been with him. Prufrock decided he’d rather drown than face the vast emptiness of his identity. But by giving Pleasantville the choice of change, it instituted profound normative values in people: love, passion, knowledge, peace, expression. All the colours of the rainbow. Though the belief that socialization morphs a person into who they are is predominant in society, it is hard to say that this is truly the case. These texts seem to emphasise the belief that socialization creates masks to conceal our core identities. Of course, socialization can shape us. Would a beggar have the same choices as a rich man? From my perspective, socialization may have us prepare that â€Å"face to meet the faces that you meet† but it may never alter our core identity, which is inevitably revealed when we confront our true emotions.

Internship Evaluation Of The Fx - 1013 Words

Angel Chang Wei Internship Evaluation Caxton FX is a UK-based foreign exchange company in London. The company’s objective is to put a Caxton card in every wallet and to facilitate corporate money transfer on behalf of its private and corporate clients. It’s a young and fast growing company which has grown from only one employee in 2004 to 120 employees in 2015. The turnover has grown from 750 million in 2013 to 1 billion in 2015. The company has zero debt and an AAA credit rating. The division which I have been assigned to is the corporate sales team, which has 30 people in 4 departments: lead generators, business development managers, senior sales managers and account managers. The board exploits market opportunities and develops new†¦show more content†¦With the information, the team gains a better understanding of the market and targets potential clients more precisely, which enhances working efficiency. The corporate sales team has a morning brief meeting every morning at 9 o’clock. In the meeting, one colleague summarizes the latest news, the main currency exchanges rates, and the major fluctuation in the foreign exchange market. Then, we have discussions on the impacts on the market in regard to the morning brief news. Next, one other colleague would proceed to give a notice with the major events that are going to happen on that day. He will also point out the possible effects on the foreign currency exchange rate. For example, he would speak of the meeting of the European Central Bank, the inflation figures in the UK and the US, the change of the interest rate in China, and so forth. Then the head of the corporate sales team will set daily goals with everyone in the junior sales team regarding the number of phone calls and trades they need to make. The morning meeting benefits everyone in the sales team to gain the ability to analyse the financial market better. It teaches me to integrate academic knowledge with daily news. The core class introduces the advantage of privatization in encouraging competition. Individual companies have to make profitable plans such as devolving management and decreasing costs, which in turn leads to greater efficiency and larger

The 18th Amendment Began the Era of Prohibition

The 18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution banned the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol, which began the era of  Prohibition. Ratified on Jan. 16, 1919, the 18th Amendment was repealed by the 21st Amendment on Dec. 5, 1933. In the over 200 years of U.S. Constitutional Law, the 18th Amendment remains the only amendment to ever have been repealed.   The 18th Amendment Key Takeaways The 18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution banned the manufacture and distribution of alcohol (known as Prohibition), on Jan. 16, 1919.  The major force behind Prohibition was 150 years of pressure by the Temperance Movement, combined with the ideals of the early 20th century Progressive Movement.The result was the destruction of an entire industry, including loss of jobs and tax revenue, and general lawlessness as people openly flaunted the law.  The Great Depression was an instrumental reason for its repeal.  The 21st Amendment repealing the 18th was ratified in December 1933, the only amendment ever to be repealed. Text of the 18th Amendment Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. Proposal of the 18th Amendment   The road to national prohibition was riddled with a plethora of states laws that mirrored a national sentiment for temperance. Of the states that already had bans on manufacturing and distributing alcohol, very few had sweeping successes as a result, but the 18th Amendment sought to remedy this.   On August 1, 1917, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution detailing a version of the above three sections to be presented to states for ratification. The vote passed 65 to 20 with Republicans voting 29 in favor and 8 in opposition while the Democrats voted 36 to 12.   On December 17, 1917, the U.S. House of Representatives voted in favor of a revised resolution 282 to 128, with Republicans voting 137 to 62 and Democrats voting 141 to 64. Additionally, four independents voted for and two against it. The Senate approved this revised version the next day with a vote of 47 to 8 where it then went on to the States for ratification. Ratification of the 18th Amendment The 18th Amendment was ratified on January 16, 1919, in Washington, D.C. with Nebraskas for vote pushing the amendment over the required 36 states needed to approve the bill. Of the 48 states in the U.S. at the time (Hawaii and Alaska became states in the U.S. in 1959), only Connecticut and Rhode Island rejected the amendment, though New Jersey did not ratify it until three years later in 1922.   The National Prohibition Act was written to define the language and execution of the amendment and despite President Woodrow Wilsons attempt to veto the act, Congress and the Senate overrode his veto and set the start date for prohibition in the United States to January 17, 1920, the earliest date allowed by the 18th Amendment.   The Temperance Movement Temperance Parade. Chicago History Museum/Getty Images At the time of its passage, the 18th Amendment was the culmination of well over a century of activity by members of the temperance movement—people who wanted the total abolishment of alcohol. In the mid-19th century in the United States and elsewhere, the rejection of alcohol began as a religious movement, but it never gained traction: The revenue from the alcohol industry was phenomenal even then. As the new century turned, however, so did the focus of the temperance leadership.   Temperance became a platform of the Progressive Movement, a political and cultural movement that was a reaction to the Industrial Revolution. The Progressives wanted to clean up slums, end child labor, enforce shorter working hours, improve working conditions for people in factories, and stop excessive drinking. Banning alcohol, they felt, would protect the family, aid personal success, and reduce or eliminate crime and poverty.   The leaders of the movement were in the Anti-Saloon League of America, who, allied with the Womens Christian Temperance Union mobilized the Protestant churches and obtained major funding from businessmen and the corporate elite. Their activities were instrumental in achieving the two-thirds majority needed in both houses to initiate what would become the 18th Amendment.   The Volstead Act   The original wording of the 18th amendment barred the manufacture, sale, transportation, and exportation of intoxicating beverages, but it didnt define what intoxicating meant. Many of the people who supported the 18th amendment believed that the real problem was saloons and that drinking was acceptable in respectable settings.  The 18th amendment didnt prohibit imports (the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 did that) but Webb-Kenyon only enforced the imports when it was illegal in the receiving states. At first, people who wanted alcohol could get it semi-legally and safely.   But the Volstead Act, which was passed by Congress and then came into effect on January 16, 1920, defined the intoxicating level at .05 percent alcohol by volume. The utilitarian arm of the temperance movement wanted to ban saloons and control alcohol production: People believed their own drinking was blameless, but it was bad for everyone else and the society at large. The Volstead Act made that untenable: If you wanted alcohol, you now had to get it illegally.   The Volstead Act also created the first Prohibition Unit, in which men and women were hired at the federal level to serve as prohibition agents. Consequences of the 18th Amendment   The result of the combined 18th Amendment and the Volstead Act was economic devastation in the liquor industry. In 1914, there were 318 wineries, in 1927 there were 27. Liquor wholesalers were cut by 96 percent, and the number of legal retailers by 90 percent. Between 1919 and 1929, tax revenue from distilled spirits dropped from $365 million to under $13 million; revenues from fermented liquors went from $117 million to virtually nothing.   Bans on liquor importation and exportation crippled American ocean liners who were competing with other countries. Farmers lost the legal market of their crops to distilleries. Its not that the framers didnt realize that they would be losing the tax revenue they got from the alcohol industry (not to mention job loss and raw material market loss): They simply believed after World War I that prosperity and economic growth would be adequately bolstered by the gains of the Progressive movement, including doing away with alcohol, to overcome any initial costs.   Bootlegging   Marcia Frost One main consequence of the 18th Amendment was the steep  increase in smuggling and bootlegging—massive quantities of alcohol were smuggled out of Canada or made in small stills. There was no funding provided in the 18th Amendment for federal policing or prosecuting drink-related crimes. Although the Volstead Act created the first federal Prohibition Units, it didnt really become effective at the national level until 1927. State courts became clogged with alcohol-related cases.   When voters recognized that even near beer productions by the limping alcohol manufacturers Coors, Miller, and Anheuser Busch were now not legally accessible, tens of millions of people refused to obey the law. Illegal operations to manufacture alcohol and speakeasies to distribute it were rife. Juries would often not convict bootleggers, who were seen as Robin Hood figures. Despite the level of overall criminality, the mass violations by the public created lawlessness and a widespread disrespect for the law.   Rise of the Mafia   The opportunities for making money in the bootlegging business were not lost on organized crime in the United States. As legitimate alcohol businesses closed, the Mafia and other gangs took control of its production and sale. These became sophisticated criminal enterprises that reaped huge profits from the illicit liquor trade.   The Mafia were protected by crooked police and politicians who were bribed to look the other way. The most notorious of the Mafia dons was Chicagos Al Capone, who earned an estimated $60 million annually from his bootlegging and speakeasy operations. Income from bootlegging flowed into the old vices of gambling and prostitution, and the resulting widespread criminality and violence added to the growing demand for repeal. Although there were arrests during the 1920s, the Mafias lock on bootlegging was only successfully broken by repeal. Support for Repeal The growth of support for the repeal of the 18th amendment had everything to do with the promises of the Progressive movement balanced with the devastation of the Great Depression.   But even before the stock market crash in 1929, the Progressive reform movement, which had seemed so idyllic in its plan for a healthier society, lost credibility. The Anti-Saloon League insisted on zero tolerance and aligned itself with distasteful elements such as the Ku Klux Klan. Young people saw progressive reform as a suffocating status quo. Many prominent officials warned about the consequences of lawlessness: Herbert Hoover made it a central plank on his successful bid for the presidency in 1928. A year after the stock market crashed, six million men were out of work; in the first three years after the crash, an average of 100,000 workers were fired every week. The politicians who had argued that progressivism would bring prosperity were now held responsible for the depression.   By the early 1930s, the same corporate and religious elite people who supported the establishment of the 18th Amendment now lobbied for its repeal. One of the first was Standard Oils John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a major financial supporter of the 18th Amendment. On the night before the 1932 Republican convention, Rockefeller said that he now supported repeal of the Amendment, despite being a teetotaler on principle.   Repeal of the 18th Amendment After Rockefeller, many other businessmen signed on, saying that the benefits of prohibition were far outweighed by the costs. There was a growing socialist movement in the country, and people were organizing into unions: The elite businessmen including Pierre Du Pont of Du Pont manufacturing and Alfred P. Sloan Jr. of General Motors were frankly terrified.   The political parties were more cautious: Both were for Resubmission of the 18th amendment to the states and if the popular vote agreed, they would move to repeal it. But they were split on who would receive economic benefits. The Republicans wanted liquor control to lie with the federal government, while the Democrats wanted it returned to the states. In 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr. quietly endorsed repeal: His main promises for the presidency were balanced budgets and fiscal integrity. After he won and the Democrats swept in with him in December 1933, the lame-duck 72nd Congress reconvened and the Senate voted to submit the 21st Amendment to state conventions. The House approved it in February. In March 1933, Roosevelt asked Congress to modify the Volstead Act to allow 3.2 percent near beer and in April it was legal in most of the country. FDR had two cases shipped to the White House. On Dec. 5, 1933, Utah became the 36th state to ratify the 21st Amendment, and the 18th Amendment was repealed.   Sources Blocker Jr., Jack S. Did Prohibition Really Work? Alcohol Prohibition as a Public Health Innovation. American Journal of Public Health 96.2 (2006): 233–43. Print.Bourdreaux, Donald J., and A.C. Pritchard. The Price of Prohibition. Arizona Law Review 36 (1994). Print.Dietler, Michael. Alcohol: Anthropological/Archaeological Perspectives. Annual Review of Anthropology 35.1 (2006): 229–49. Print.Levine, Harry Gene. The Birth of American Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite, and the Problem of Lawlessness. Contemporary Drug Problems 12 (1985): 63–115. Print.Miron, Jeffrey A., and Jeffrey Zwiebel. Alcohol Consumption During Prohibition. The American Economic Review 81.2 (1991): 242–47. Print.Webb, Holland. Temperance Movements and Prohibition. International Social Science Review 74.1/2 (1999): 61–69. Print.